transactions is not assessed from the perspective of the parties in question but from the market as a whole. 27 Since certain types of private agreements threaten to jeopardise third parties, it sets in place external constraints on such transactions. As a result, competition law is by its very definition at constant odds with the principle of freedom of contract.
28
This tension became, for instance, apparent in the Bronner 29 case where the ECJ was asked a question relating to a refusal by an Austrian newspaper to grant a competitor access to its nationwide delivery scheme. Having analysed the laws of the Member States, AG Jacobs held that the freedom of contract constitutes an essential element of free trade and that a careful balancing will always be required before competition policy should override this freedom.
30
Even under this more 'classical' view of the two branches of law, this tension can however be brought in a different perspective. Every balancing between the freedom of contract and the freedom to compete has to be understood in light of the more general concept of economic freedom. 31 In a way, competition and contract law "are […] the protection of competition by prohibiting abuses of a firm's dominant position, it is by its very definition targeted at situations involving an imbalance in bargaining powers.
The protection of the weaker party therefore plays a pivotal role in the application of this provision; very much alike the general policy aim of many pieces of secondary legislation.
36
In fact, European contract law -most notably in the area of consumer protection -is equally restrictive on the contractual freedom of parties in its attempt to mitigate the lack of bargaining power and information asymmetry.
Under the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts, for instance, a contractual clause which has not been individually negotiated and which runs counter the It still remains to be seen how far the ECJ is willing to intervene in this matter.
The above-mentioned discussion might be seen either as an academic nightmare or a regulatory opportunity. As regards the latter, it reveals in how far the Commission is able to define the areas of contract law (or private law in general) which are still left for Member States to regulate. But it also shows that there needs to be (once again) a more informed discussion on what EU competition law actually seeks to protect -an issue which has never been properly solved. 
The Notion of Fairness
Last, there is another potential for cross-influence stemming from the case law on Article 102 TFEU in regards to the notion of fair pricing. Both in competition law and European private law instruments, courts are seized to assess the fairness and justifiability of prices between parties. In the famous United Brands case, the ECJ held that the imposition of prices, which show no reasonable relation to the economic value of what has been supplied will qualify as an abuse. 51 A comparison can be made with Directive 86/653 for self-employed commercial agents. According to Article 6 of this Directive, a commercial agent is entitled to a remuneration, which corresponds to customary practice for the goods forming the subject of his or her agency in the absence of any specific agreement.
Where no such customary practice is present, the agent shall be entitled to a reasonable remuneration. On the latter, the decision in United Brands and other cases on excessive pricing might prove influential, for in the past ways have been found to overcome the lack of comparable prices to make such assessment. 52 Since the determination of prices is always an economically intricate undertaking, the underlying test has become increasingly sophisticated. Not only the overall costs plus profit margin are taken into consideration, but regard is also had to non-cost related factors and the particular circumstances of the case. 53 In view of the Agency Directive, the case law on Article 102 is particularly important because the ECJ has been concerned both with excessively high and low prices. Although the jurisprudence on too low prices on the purchasing side is by far not as rich as it is regarding high prices, there are certain indications that this will change in the future. 54 -7:207) . Exploitation is hereby understood as taking an excessive benefit or unfair advantage of the weaker party's position which will commonly manifest itself in a disparity in considerations. The economic analysis underlying the investigation of such disparity can indeed be facilitated by having regard to previous decision made in competition law cases.
Some might argue that allowing for an excessive intertwinement between the jurisprudence in competition law and the interpretation of private law instruments will lead to an undesirable mingling of actually distinct branches of law. 56 However, it has to be stressed again that competition law in the European Union enjoys a genuine constitutional status and should therefore be allowed to exert an influence on all other areas. This indeed will lead to more coherence within the various branches themselves.
Above all, there should be the awareness that such influence exists in the first place. And this awareness is also ought to shape future developments in the area of competition law.
The chance to attain more coherence can easily be wasted by not coordinating new reforms in the various branches. For instance, it would be highly advisable to provide for the same (or at least comparable) periods of time within which parties may seek avoidance.
The Characteristics and Effects of Decentralised
Competition Law Enforcement "Modernisation of competition policy" is the terminology reserved to those reforms and developments which started briefly before the end of the millennium and which culminated in the enactment of Regulation 1/2003. The modernisation process had both a substantive and a procedural dimension, both being important in the discussion on the effects of competition law on European private law. On the whole, the following discussion particularly relates to the afore-mentioned new modes of governance and in how far they impact the private law branch. But it will equally become clear that hybridisation of remedies plays a substantial role in competition law cases. possibility of a binding Code of Conduct before issuing sector-specific rules for exemption.
Also here, approval would eventually occur ex post.
The Example of Sport Regulation
The area of sports regulation constitutes an unorthodox example of where such a model could be tested. Since the Bosman 123 ruling, the sports associations have had a difficult time coping with the unwanted (and unexpected) influence of EU law. But the practice of sport is not only subject to the rules of free movement, but also subject to European competition law. 124 The problem for sports associations and clubs at the moment is that the legal framework governing their activities is regrettably unclear. 125 So far the EU has approached the issue by combining soft law instruments with a case-by-case analysis of the CJEU. 126 Whereas this indeed seems most appropriate for the Union, it is causing anything but certainty for stakeholders.
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The possibilities to overcome this state of affairs are varied, but only few of them seem realistic and/or fully adequate. Indeed, the most drastic step would be to call for
Treaty amendments in order to once and for all clarify the status of sports in the Union; yet this idea seems as drastic as it is unrealistic in the current political climate. Another idea would be the issuing of further soft law instruments. However, only few will believe this genuinely solves the problem. Lastly, at least as far as Competition law is concerned, a Block Exemption Regulation seems to be in order on first sight. Also here some drawbacks can be identified: Most notably, due to the intertwinement of competition and free movement rules when it comes to sport regulation, a Block Exemption Regulation can never lead to a satisfactory result. 126 Most notably are the following: Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing common policies, annexed to the Conclusions of the Nice European Council, 7.-9. December, Bulletin EU 12-2000; Report from the European Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework ('The Helsinki Report on Sport'), COM(1999), 644.
On the other hand, self-regulation or co-regulation could provide for an alternative. On self-regulation, the Commission could invite specific sport associations to set up Codes of Conduct which deal with issues of: "organising sports on a national level, the creation of new sporting organisations, club relocation, the ban on organising competition outside a given territory, the regulatory role of sporting event organisers, the transfer systems forms of governance should be considered.
128 Commission debates the application of its rules to sports, IP/99/133, p. 3.
129 To put it in the words of Micklitz, the question should always be "which norms shall be elaborated and enforced at what level and by whom": Micklitz 2008, p. 3.
Conclusions
Due to the economisation of law, private law in the Union is increasingly regulatory.
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This allows competition law -which equally pursues a regulatory function -to influence the private law branch thanks to its constitutional status in the European legal order. The hypothesis that European private law can be shaped and directed from the boundaries of traditional private law and the the centre of European market law is therefore confirmed.
It is hardly imaginable that this will only hold true for competition law; for also other 'core' areas of EU (economic) constitutional law, such as the law of free movement, or European equality law, may be expected to reveal similar results. 131 This shows that there needs to be a more informed discussion on the sources of European private law.
It will be the task of mainly the CJEU and academia to identify the possibilities of cross-influences between the various branches in order to allow for a more coherent legal framework. This coherence is all the more required in light of the fragmentation of European private law as well as the hybrid nature of remedies. In the absence of farreaching Union power in the area of procedural law, regulation often works indirectly through the provision of general rules and principles. As far as the competition/private law interface is concerned, the rules on private enforcement constitute a perfect example for this peculiar feature of European market regulation.
Even more important, however, seems the certainty that new forms of governance lie at the heart of many recent developments in the area of private law. General decentralisation and the involvement of stakeholders in the law-making process may (somehow paradoxically) further the Europeanisation of private law. Whereas the Union remains the dominant policy-maker, private actors are given more responsibility in the process of setting up rules and their enforcement. Boldly speaking, this is a means to overcome lengthy political discourses between the EU and Member States. As Member States are, to a certain extent, taken out of the process, the Union directly acts grants the stakeholders involved greater power in regulating their respective field. On the one hand, this might indeed cause problems of legitimacy which need to be addressed. On the other hand, the multi-level structure of the Union calls for a rethinking of how regulation -particularly regulation of private legal relationships -should be done. Lastly, the discussion should have revealed that competition law plays a pivotal process in the afore-mentioned developments. As a result of its constitutional status, it exerts a noteworthy impact on other branches which have been treated as completely distinct in the past. Where formerly only the tensions between, for instance, contract and competition law have been focused upon, there is now a rising awareness that the latter might play a more and more complementary role as well. And this role is not only to restrict parties in their freedom to contract, but to vest them with rights against misconduct of other market participants, including co-contractors. In this sense, it would be interesting to scrutinise in what way the influence of competition law relates to the relationship between contract and tort law in general.
It is to be hoped that the acquis group, in drafting new instruments, will take a greater account of the role of competition law in regulatory private law. But also the Commission, most notably when enacting new Block Exemption Regulations, should have due regard to the impact these measures have on private parties. After all, it has been seen that these
Regulations can equally be considered as contractual rules insofar as they standardise cartel agreements. My claim therefore reads that a more thorough investigation needs
to be conducted what aspects of private legal relations are influenced by such new instruments and how. These considerations have hitherto been completely absent at least as far as the Commission is concerned.
